clausewitz

On Sustainment

Carl Maria von Clausewitz

 

On Sustainment

 

By Jamie Arbuckle, for Peacehawks

 

A major factor in the planning, the development and the conduct of operations is sustainment: keeping it up, staying in the fight, absorbing the losses, and then absorbing more losses.

As the Duke of Wellington said as the Battle of Waterloo developed, „Hard pounding, gentlemen, let’s see who pounds the longest.“

Sustainment might be, after the traditional ten, the eleventh principle of war.

What follows here is the gleaning of an amateur researcher from fifteen minutes on the Internet.

Russia-Ukraine

What does this mean in the Ukraine today?

Ukrainian casualties to date are approximately 120,000 killed, and 170,000 wounded.  In a country of almost 50 million, that is probably marginally acceptable. If it is not, then perhaps the Ukrainian government might take more interest in the estimated 250,000 males of military age currently living in Germany and, of course, the many, many more of their “refugee” brethren the world over.

Total Russian casualties (killed and wounded) in the past two years have been, according to US estimates, 325,000 or, as estimated by the Ukrainians, 635,000. *  In a country of almost 150 million, the lower figure might be acceptable; the higher would probably not be. And Ukrainians know what they are fighting for, while the Russians almost certainly do not – witness the thousands of deserters from the Russian army formations in and around Ukraine.

By contrast, the Americans lost in Vietnam 58,220 killed – in 20 years (1955-75).  In a nation of (then) just over 200 million, that was not sustainable.

If we take the more conservative American estimates of Russian casualties (above), and if we assume that 1/3 of that total were killed,  then the Russians have lost in two years over 100,000 killed, almost twice as many as the Americans lost in 20 years in Vietnam. And, as with the American forces in Vietnam in the 60s, Russian forces today may be very much on, certainly close to, an edge.

Israel

Israel has a population of 9.5 million. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) consists of 169,000 regular forces, and 495,000 reserves. That is nearly 700,000, which is almost 8% of the population.

The Israeli defense budget for 2024 is USD 30.5 billion, which is 4.5% of the Israeli economy, and which is the highest in the OECD; it is 12.4% of the total budget of Israel.  It is generally reckoned that a highly sophisticated, post-industrial nation can for limited periods expend 10% of its budget on defense.

Since 1948, Israel has received USD158 billion, the largest aid granted in US history. US military aid to Israel in 2023 was nearly 4 billion USD, which is more than 10% of the total defense budget (for 2024).

In 2023 the Israeli defense budget was overspent by 32%, and in 2024 the budget was increased by 87%.

Iron Dome, the anti-missile missile system, was provided to Israel by the US at a cost of USD1 billion.

Fighting on three fronts -or is it now four? – and dependent on external aid, Israel and the IDF must also be very much on edge.

Conclusion

 

Sustainment will be a very large elephant in any room where war is discussed, yet there has been no speculation about nor any media coverage of this issue in either of the two wars discussed here. Be in no doubt that everyone involved, whether American, Israeli or Palestinian, Russian or Ukrainian, carries this with them – everywhere and always.

It must also be self-evident that neither the Russian nor the Israeli leadership has had any idea they might find themselves in this position at this time, and it will also be abundantly clear that neither has ever had the slightest idea of what to do about it.

Pounding harder might be the best thing to do.

  • The higher figures for Russian casualties arise partly because they had many more troops deployed in the area, plus the fact that attacking troops will commonly suffer up to three times as many casualties as the defenders.
Guernica, Ruinen

WHERE: WERE WE? ARE WE? GO WE? THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY IS COMING OF AGE

Pictured above: Guernica, 1937

- by Jamie Arbuckle for Peacehawks
13 March 2022

Show us a vision of a world made new.

- Eleanor Roosevelt (1)

INTRODUCTION

Not so very long ago – mere weeks I think – we thought the Covid pandemic was one of the worst things to have befallen us in this still-young century. If we could just hang on long enough to survive that, we’d never worry again. And, earlier this year, it did seem we had turned some sort of corner, and we could relax just a bit. We still needed to continue to be careful, optimistic and grateful, but still …

How wrong we were. Now we find ourselves involved, peripherally or directly, in the worst humanitarian emergency in Europe since WWII.

Russia has again invaded Ukraine, West Europeans are scrambling with outdated and under strength defense establishments and our modern world seems paralyzed and frightened. The very fabric of a modern grouping of liberal democracies is directly threatened as never before in most of our lifetimes.

It is time for a brief stocktaking before we jump onto too many horses and try to ride off on all of them.

In this brief article, we will look at just two aspects of the current situation:

• We will review the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, which established the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine; and
• We will look at the strategy and the effects of air wars.

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Gorbachev and Reagan signing INF Accord, the White House, 08.12.1987

NUCLEAR FIRST USE: UNLEARNING OUR HISTORY

 

 

- by Jamie Arbuckle, for Peacehawks

 

We learn from history that we do not learn from history.

 

-  Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel

 

When Mikhail S. Gorbachev (1931-) became general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, he launched his nation on a dramatic new course. His dual program of “perestroika” (“restructuring”) and “glasnost” (“openness”)[1]introduced profound changes in economic practice, internal affairs and international relations. Within five years, Gorbachev’s revolutionary program swept communist governments throughout Eastern Europe from power.

This transformation also brought an end to the Cold War, which had dominated the affairs of the North Atlantic alliance and of the Warsaw Pact for nearly  two generations. Along that way he successfully negotiated with Ronald Reagan the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty, which  intended to eliminate short, medium and intermediate range (500-3420 kms) nuclear weapons from Europe[2].  By 1991, almost 3000 weapons had been removed, and there followed 10 years of verifications.

 

Now the US government has announced that it will abrogate that treaty.  Russia, which denies accusations of non-compliance, has in its turn announced that they will as well cease to be constrained by the Treaty. And while the Europeans recognize the likelihood of Russian “cheating” on the accord, their preference to negotiate compliance – “trust but verify”[3]- is likely to fall on deaf ears in Washington and in the Kremlin.

 

The seemingly preferred American alternative to the INF, a wider treaty embraced by all nuclear powers (the current treaty involves only the US and Russia), has scant future.  China, a negligible world power in 1987, now has quite different ambitions and senses much greater opportunities[4], while India is very much on the defensive in respect of China’s growing power, and ditto Pakistan of India, and so it will go – or more likely, comprehensive nuclear weapons policy will go as it has always gone: nowhere.  And Russia has already tried that in 2007.  Chafing under a threat largely of his own imagining from the other nuclear states unconstrained by treaty, Vladimir Putin called the INF a Cold War “relic”, and proposed a “global” INF Treaty to the 2008 Conference on Disarmament.

 

During the Cold War the U.S. refused to pledge no first use of nuclear weapons.  In 1961 the Kennedy Administration considered launching a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union, if Khrushchev followed through on his threat of a Soviet takeover of West Berlin. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had determined that West Berlin could not be defended by conventional weapons alone.[5]  Then and since,US strategic policy has been that tactical nuclear weapons would be a potential response to an overwhelming conventional attack. The policy of first use is already being informally cited as essential to the western defense of the Baltics.[6]

 

In 1993 Russia renounced a long-standing Soviet policy which had pledged no first use of nuclear weapons.[7]  This policy reversal in fact brings Russia into line with other nuclear states.

As a 2016 report by the Carnegie Institute put it, “In the eyes of nuclear-weapon states such as the United States and Russia, and even the United Kingdom and France, nuclear weapons are not qualitatively different from conventional weapons. Despite the massive destructive power and lethality of nuclear weapons, they are considered to be usable in ways similar to conventional weapons. …”[8] Indeed, according to a 1978 report by an American assistant secretary of defense, “It is generally acknowledged that atomic weapons are rapidly achieving a conventional status in military planning for national and allied defenses.” And a 1957 book by Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, helped to present a case for limited nuclear war. By 1971, American Army medium artillery (155 mm) batteries were nuclear-capable.[9]

It is reasonably to be expected that the arms race will now be renewed.  It may further be expected that Europeans – principally of course the Germans – will as a result of this again be asked to accept American nuclear weapons on their soil, with the accompanying complete control of those weapons by US custodians. As this is being written, a NATO summit in Brussels is considering the re-introduction of nuclear weapons in Europe; the Secretary General and at least the defense ministers of Great Britain and of Germany have said that this option must be given full consideration.[10]

 

If there is indeed to be a return to the Cold War nuclear face-off in Europe, it will potentially be even more dangerous than before, as both the major protagonists clearly  believe and have publicly stated that the first use of nuclear weapons is an accepted strategy.

 

The Europeans must not accept this renewal of military tensions in Europe. Germany especially must not again become a repository of nuclear weapons of which they have scant knowledge and over which they have little control. The American military colonization of Europe – particularly of Germany – is not to be repeated. This point is perhaps not lost on the Germans: as recently reported  in our local newspaper, of those polled in Germany as to their perceptions of the greatest threat to their security, 56% identified the United States; North Korea was a distant second.[11]  Euphemisms such as “sub-strategic”, “tactical” and “limited” must be seen through; veiled speech must not be allowed to mask the enormity of what is here contemplated – again.  The Poles in their eagerness to build Fort Trump[12]must be restrained by a centre which – this time – just has to hold.

 

We have studied our history, and we will not be condemned to repeat it.

[1]Seehttp://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/perestroika-and-glasnost (accessed 02.02.2019)

[2]  Gorbachev’s actions also inadvertently set the stage for the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, which dissolved into 15 individual republics. Gorbachev resigned from office on December 25, 1991.

[3]This is a Russian proverb, to which Ronald Reagan was introduced by the American writer Susanne Massie. “The proverb was adopted as a signature phrase by Reagan, who subsequently used it frequently when discussing U.S. relations with the Soviet Union.”  See wikepedia, “trust but verify” (accessed 03.02.2019)

[4]  China’s No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,  by Zhenqiang, Pan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – Reports, 28 Oct 2016 (https://www.questia.com/magazine/1P3-4285520441/china-s-no-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons, accessed 02.02.2019). China has from its earliest acquisition of nuclear weapons systems in 1964 steadfastly renounced first use against any no-nuclear nation or nuclear-free zone.  This article seems to conflate “first use” and “first strike.”  They are not the same thing.  Briefly, first use is a response and is defensivein nature and intent; first strike may be pre-emptive and is thus offensive in nature and intent.

[5]”JFK’s First Strike Plan”, by Fed Kaplan, The Atlantic Monthly, October 2001, www.atlantic.com (accessed 02.02.2019)

[6]”One way to convince Russia of NATO’s resolve and readiness would be, perhaps, to tighten the link between NATO’s conventional and nuclear forces by integrating both elements in exercises—as NATO did during the Cold War.” “NATO’s Options”, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 28 March 2018 (carnegieendowment.org, accessed 13 February 2019).  Other discussants variously note the current inadequacy of NATO conventional forces in the Baltic, from which conventional wisdom will infer the necessity for “non-strategic” nuclear deterrent, which in turn implies first use.

[7]Russia Drops No-First-Use Pledge on Its Nuclear Weapons,By Daniel Sneider, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor November 4, 1993, (https://www.csmonitor.com/1993/1104/04011x.html, accessed 02.02.2019)

[8] Zhenqiang, Pan, op cit

[9]The History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons from July 1945 through September 1974, by the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), February 1978

[10]See zdf.de, “Raketen ohne Kontrolle”, 13 February 2019.

[11]Salzburger Nachrichten, “Deutsche sehen USA als die größte Gefahr”, 14 February 2019

[12]”Speaking with Trump and reporters in the Oval Office on Tuesday, Poland’s president, Andrzej Duda, told Trump that he’d like the U.S. to create a permanent military base with that name in Poland — and that Poland would pay more than $2 billion for the project.”  See foxnews.com, 18 September 2018 (accessed 13 February 2019).