a review essay of the book Die Rückkehr des Krieges, by Franz-Stefan Gady[1]
Prepared for Peacehawks by Ingrid Lehmann and Jamie Arbuckle
Si vis pacem, para bellum.
-Vegetius Renatus, ca 450 AD
During a recent Global Future Forum at Schloss Leopoldskron in Salzburg we participated in a session on „The Return of War“, chaired by Martin Weiss. One of the main presenters was an Austrian-born military analyst, Franz-Stefan Gady, who has recently published a book, which is so far only available in German, and is entitled The Return of War – Why We Must Learn to Deal With War Again.
Gady has covered from both fronts the Afghanistan intervention and the war of Russia in Ukraine. Thus he draws on both theoretical and personal experience and, when we heard him in Salzburg on 23 August in the beautiful setting in Schloss Leopoldskron, he had just returned from another trip to the front in Ukraine.
Having worked at think-tanks in the United States and Great Britain, Gady has in-depth knowledge of the transatlantic defense establishments. With the unique combination of a military observer from the front lines, and with the skills of an experienced analyst, he is able to present a detailed appreciation of where the United States might be tending in its Defence policy (or the lack thereof), Gady spells out a frightening series of options of where war might be encountered in the near future. As the book is written in German, it primarily addresses Austrian, Swiss and German audiences. These countries have either claimed post-World war II neutrality between east and west or, as in the case of Germany, taken a back-seat within NATO after the fall of the wall, the reunion of the former two Germanies and the demise of the Soviet Union. The percieved “peace dividend” has led to neglect of the armed forces not only but especially in Austria and Germany, whose military establishments have been financially starved and generally undervalued in those two well-to-do countries.
In early chapters of his book Gady lists prominent historical examples of ingenuity on the part of military leaders from Napoleon to the Prussian Generals Scharnhorst, Moltke and others, who, in their time, reformed and expanded their armed forces, inspired their populations and led them to dominate much of Europe. Gady’s work is thorough on how countries get into wars, but weak on how to end wars, other than through military victory by the stronger, after horrendous loss of lives and physical destruction.
Oleksandra Matviichuk, the Ukranian human rights lawyer and Nobel Peace Prize laureate of 2022 (who spoke later in the day at the Salzburg Forum) did focus on envisioning peace after war, and on functioning and lasting security structures. Here come to mind not just Organisations such as NATO or the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which includes Russia and her allies), but also the security mechanisms enshrined in the United Nations Charter.
Gady’s strength is the analysis of the causes of war: hubris, miscalculations, overdependence on technological tools in theatres such as Afghanistan, and unpredictable developments, often described as „the Fog of War.“ The common tendency is to underestimate the opponent’s staying power and resilience, while overestimating one’s own. He cites an unnamed German military analyst who told him that Germany, had it been confronted by the Russian barrage on the Ukraine in February 2022, would not have lasted more than three or four days. His book thus addresses itself mostly to German defense capacities. Germany, he believes, needs to take a leading role in the defense of Europe particularly in the face of Russian threats to reclaim the Baltic states.
The author is aware of a strong cultural bias against the military[2] and the arms industry in large parts of German society. Gady cites a public opinion survey among Germans that only 38 percent would be prepared to defend themselves when attacked by another country. See, for example, the recent book by Ole Nymoen entitled Warum ich niemals für mein Land kämpfen würde (Why I would never fight for my country). Oleksandra Matviichuk pronounced in contrast: „Peace does not come when the country under attack stops defending itself.“
Gady describes two likely scenarios for an attack by Russia in the Baltics which would place Germany and Poland, as well as Finland and Sweden, on the frontlines of a new war. In this regard, Gady says that having enjoyed the post-cold-war „peace dividend“, Germans must now face the new realities of the dangers of war in Europe. Austria’s insistence on the „neutrality“ ankered in its constitution is regrettably not discussed in this book.[3]
The author is a Fellow and Adjunct Faculty member at the Center for a New American Security in Washington D.C. He wrote this book prior to the change in the U.S. government in January 2025, but his analysis of the future U.S. security policy points to several miscalculations by European policy makers regarding American commitment to NATO and the transatlantic alliance. He assumes that the current security emphasis of the United States, in pivoting to Asia and the Pacific, continues a trend that has long been observed in successive U.S. administrations. Gady does not consider this development as a new isolationism, but as a reorientation away from Europe.
We share this analysis and, from a European perspective, consider the emerging policies of the current U.S. government as a final wake-up call for Europe. Assuming that Russia no longer represents a benign presence in Europe, a development seen even before its attack on the Ukraine, it is paramount to undertake a speedy consolidation of the European defense architecture, while keeping channels of communication open to the East, especially in respect of the Ukrainian war. Gady also puts to us the latest developments in the use of new technology in war. He concludes: „The unmanned systems alone would self-evidently not be decisive in war. They help enormously to achieve the prerequisites for a successful ground offensive.“ (p 61)
Indeed, this may be said in general of all air war. As H.G. Wells wrote (in 1908, before anyone in the world had any sort of air force):
Aerial weapons were at once enormously destructive and entirely indecisive. …
From above they could inflict enormous damage, they could reduce any organized government to …incapacity, but they could not disarm, still less could they occupy the surrendered territory below.”[4]
Aerial war and repeated highly destructive aerial attacks have never been decisive, not in Guernica, not in London, not in Berlin and not in Hanoi. And in Ukraine, after three years of unrelenting and remorseless Russian air assaults, causing about 14,000 civilian deaths in three years (German bombing of England in WWII killed 60,000 in two years), Russia has advanced only 150 kms into Ukraine, and suffered nearly 1 million casualties.[5]
And the Ukrainians don’t seem to be giving up, indeed they are steadfastly adapting to the dangers confronting them each day with unrelenting bombing campaigns. Schools and medical facilities are moving underground and seem to be functioning well. People, while traumatised, have become more resilient and manage to cope.
In another example of the indecisivness of air wars: on the night of 30-31 May 1942, nearly 1000 British bombers attacked Cologne. One of the primary objects of the operation was the destruction of the railyards of Cologne, judged essential to the sustainment of Wehrmacht forces in the occupied countries of western Europe. The next day, 31 May, captured Allied aircrew were moved through Cologne – by rail.
And, as we are now writing (8 September), Russia has launched the “largest drone and missile attack of the war”: more than 900 drones and missiles rained down upon Kyiv, Dnipro, Kremenchuck, Odessa “and other cities … President Zelensky confirmed that four people were killed and 44 were injured in the strikes.”[6]
What does all of this mean for Europe? Gady refers to the “obligation of the USA, in the case of a nuclear attack on European NATO-members, to launch a nuclear counter-attack on the aggressor.” (page 95). Jamie’s military career nearly spanned the Cold War, and he spent 13 years in Germany with the Canadian and the German Armies. Neither he nor, so far as he knows, anyone else, ever for an instant believed that the US would risk the destruction of Washington to save Berlin. But no one ever said anything like that because, as Gady says, “If this nuclear deterrent loses its credibility, so could an aggressor, primarily Russia, mount an attempt to advance their power interests, strengthened by ‘nuclear blackmail.`”. It is a play, and everyone knows their lines, but the reality was and is always out there.
As to the currently much-diminished American Army presence in Germany, it is, so says Gady, sufficient to maintain a shadow of credibility of an American commitment in Europe. In 1914 the Chief of the (UK) Imperial General Staff Ironsides asked Ferdinand Foch (then commanding a Corps of the French Army, later Allied Supreme Commander) what England could do for France; Foch replied, “Send one British soldier, and we will see that he is killed”. Both fulfilled their bargain.
Gady provides us with a novel and quite useful set of influences on the description and conduct of war. These are the Domains: Land, Air, Sea, Cybernetics and Space (pp 212-241). These descriptions are a useful classification, and this summary makes clear how important the coordination of efforts in these “domains” is: successful operations are joint operations, a lesson too often realised only by overcoming single-service rivalries of those who should long ago have learned better. And joint operations, if not skillfully and flawlessly handled, can quickly turn into a soup sandwich – think Dieppe 1942.[7]
Useful also is Gady’s exposition on resources (The Conduct of War is Influenced by Resources, pp 242- 245), and this in turn leads to an equally useful discourse on logistics (pp 246-251). Sustainability is always the elephant in any war room (for more on this, see our post On Sustainment, 3 October, 2024). It has been said that, while amateurs dream of operations, professionals talk of logistics. The replacement, of equipment and of personnel, and resupply of all commodities, is a vital function of war. At the Battle of El Alamein in November 1942, nearly a fifth of Montgomery’s tanks were machines recovered from the battlefield and repaired; indeed there was an elaborate Armoured Recovery System, which married up wounded crews emerging from hospitals with tanks and guns emerging from workshops.
The most important resource in war is, as always, the people. The US lost in Vietnam in twenty years about 20,000 killed – and that was too many. The Soviets lost in Afghanistan in 10 years 15,000 killed – and that was too many. Russia has now lost in Ukraine about 1 million – is that not too many? To advance 150 kms in two years? And so what? Is Gady right in assuming that Russian aggression against the Ukraine will automatically tend to Russian aggression in the Baltics? Would Russia be able to sustain a war on two fronts?
The main question for Peacehawks:
When will the time be ripe for international diplomacy to intercede in this seemingly intractable war? Many eminent political analysts and researchers have written about the need for the right timing of mediation efforts by third parties to a conflict.[8] Of utmost importance is the concept of “ripeness”, most often arising from a mutually hurting stalemate; this shared pain has often led to a willingness to negotiate for peace. Obviously, the two-person summit in Alaska in August was not the beginning of a major peace negotiation process between Russia and Ukraine. At issue already now is consideration of who might be the appropriate mediators, acceptable to both parties and having the international standing to achieve success in this seemingly intractable conflict. Will the United Nations General Assembly or its Secretary-General play a leading role? Gady does not help us in the search for peaceful solutions.
In conclusion, we have found this book challenging, enlightening and rewarding. Primarily we take it as sounding a clear warning to Europe. The European Union, while somewhat strengthened in its political centre, particularly its common foreign policy in recent years, still has no army. It is an organization of states composed of predominantly democratic countries with two members run by autocrats , i.e. Hungary and Slovakia, who act like trojan horses for the Russians. These centrifugal forces could conceivably get stronger, should there be further national elections leading to right-wing governments in other European countries in the near future. We hope not to find find ourselves in the situation described by W.B. Yeats:
“Things fall apart, the centre cannot hold”.
Europe must strengthen the centripetal forces, the ties that bind, and must build and reinforce institutions and practices which will strengthen European presence, its policies and its authority. Above all the European Union must develop a European consensus on a range of major activities, and this may come at the expense of some degrees of national sovereignties. Franz-Stefan Gady has shown us how urgent this is: Europe must save herself, perhaps she must be saved from herself. Otherwise, we may find ourselves in the situation that caused Lord Grey, the British Foreign Secretary to say in August 1914: “The lights are going out all over Europe, we will not see them lit again in our lifetimes.”
We who love peace must prepare for the possibility of war.
Endnotes
[1] Gady, Franz-Stefan, Die Rückkehr des Krieges: Warum wir wieder lernen müssen, mit Krieg umzugehen, Quadriga, Köln, Germany, 2024. All English translations in this review are by the reviewers.
[2] Nymoen belongs to a group of left-wing pacifist commentators frequently seen on German talk shows.
[3] In an interview with an Austrian economist last year, Gady spoke of „parasitical pacifism“ of Austrians who have been lucky and felt comfortable under the implied NATO umbrella, without having to contribute to it.
[4] Wells, H.G.,The War in the Air, Harmondsworth, 1908 and 1941
[5] Casualty figures for any conflict are little reliable while the conflict is going on. Most estimates we have seen do not differentiate between killed, wounded and captured. Reports by the parties are of course suspect; British and American estimates agree roughly on the figures we have used here.
[6] Reuters, „Russia launches largest drone and missile attack of the war“, 8 September 2025
[7] The Allied raid on Dieppe took place on 19 Aug 1942. Of 6000 soldiers, principally Canadian, 3,600 were killed, wounded or captured. Allied naval guns could not fire indirectly, thus they could not engage German artillery sited on the reverse slopes of the cliffs above the assault beach. The air support, grudging and inadequate as it was, was of little effect due to weather, which had been poorly predicted. A painting of the Dieppe coast, in the National Gallery in Ottawa since the Thirties, showed clearly the roughly gravelled beaches which the Allied tanks could not traverse. It is said that this failure resulted in much improved Joint Operations staffing and procedures, which were essential to susequent amphibious operations in North Africa, Sicily and Normandy,
[8] See the comprehensive writings by Louis Kriesberg, William Zartman, Chester Crocker, Pamela Aall and Fen Osler Hampton and others about the timing of mediation in intractable conflicts.